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Abstract
Especially in oncology and in critical care, the provision of
medical care can require therapeutic choices that could go beyond
the patient’s will or intentions of the protection of his health, with
the possible adoption of medical behaviors interpreted as unrea-
sonable obstinacy or, at the opposite extreme, as euthanasia. In
some cases, the demand for obstinate therapeutic services could
come from the patient or from his relatives, in which case the
dilemma arises for the health professional between rejecting such
a request, in respect of their professional autonomy, or abiding by
it for fear of a professional care responsibility for therapeutic
abandonment. We analyzed and commented on emblematic clini-
cal cases brought to court for alleged wrong medical conduct due
to breach of the prohibition of unreasonable obstinacy. In health-
care it is impossible to fix a general rule defining any therapeutic
act as appropriate, because on one hand there are technical assess-
ments of medical competence, and on the other the perception of
the patient and of his family members of the usefulness of the
health care provided, which may be in contrast. The medical act
cannot make treatments that are inappropriate for the needs of care
or even be unreasonable; conversely, before the request by the
patient or by his family members for disproportionate health serv-
ices in relation to the results they may give in practice, in compli-
ance with the legislative and deontological provisions, the doctor
can refuse them, thus safeguarding both his decision-making
autonomy and, therefore, his professional dignity.
Introduction
In oncology and in critical care, patients treated have a short
life expectancy or in some others treatment is no longer capable of
counteracting the progressive worsening of their clinical condi-
tions.
In those circumstances there is a substantial risk of making
therapeutic choices that could go beyond the patient’s will, with
the possible adoption of euthanasia or of medical conducts even
characterized by attitudes of unreasonable obstinacy with the
infliction of unnecessary suffering and pain.1
In case this occurred, is it conceivable that there is a remedy
to the suffering caused by unreasonable obstinacy or, on the legal
front, a right to compensation for damages deriving from this
behavior?
In some cases, the demand for obstinate therapeutic services
could come from the patient or from his relatives.2,3 In such a case,
the health professional is faced with the dilemma between reject-
ing their request according to his own clinical conviction or
accepting it for fear of a charge for professional negligence.4
In some respects, this is a new problem, connected to the
duties of doctors and to the limits to their security position. It is a
problem concerning any profiles of civil and/or criminal liability
of those who intervene pharmacologically and/or surgically in an
attempt to delay the moment of death despite that, according to
medical science, no benefit for the patient can be expected from
that given treatment.
Design and Methods
In this context it seemed useful to refer to clinical events with
judicial implications in terms of unreasonable obstinacy.
The selected clinical cases appear interesting as they are
emblematic of behaviors of unreasonable obstinacy, however, in
some cases solicited by the patient and uncritically implemented
by the doctor. In the field of civil law, particularly interesting is the
clinical case of Michael,5 a child born in 2002 in a French public
hospital. When his mother asked for assistance to give birth, the
doctors, who were occupied elsewhere, did not arrive in time to
diagnose an abnormality of the fetal heart rhythm.
Michael was born in a state of apparent death, i.e. in a clinical
condition characterized by absence of pulse, flat and immobile
thorax, no excretions, loss of heat, elasticity and flexibility,
rigidity, cooling, onset of lividity on the face and eye opacity.
The team made any attempt to revive the baby, but to no avail:
twenty minutes after delivery, the gynecologist informed the
parents of the baby’s death. However, as this news was reported,
the doctors continued their resuscitation efforts, until after twenty
more minutes of intensive care, Michael’s heart began beating
again. The brain, however, had suffered serious irreversible
hypoxic damage on an ischemic basis resulting in infantile
cerebral palsy.
This clinical case arrived in court for a claim of compensation
for damages, submitted by the parents against the health workers,
arising from clinically obstinate therapeutic interventions.
Another emblematic and painful story took place in Italy,
protagonist one-month old baby (Davide), born in 2009 with the
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Potter Syndrome.6 The mother of Davide, at the 20th week of
pregnancy, received ultrasound diagnosis of the absence of
amniotic fluid, probably attributable to the rupture of the amniotic
sac or to the lack of the kidneys of the unborn child. The pregnant
woman was reassured by subsequent ultrasound evidence of the
presence of the organs of the urinary tract of the unborn child and
decided to continue her pregnancy.7
The newly born Davide was immediately transferred to the
Neonatal Intensive Care Unit, where he was intubated, had his
pleural space drained and was subjected to pharmacological
therapy to promote lung expansion.
Subsequently, the mother of David went to the facility to visit
her son and to have an interview with the doctor. On that occasion
she was informed that her child was affected by “Potter Syndrome”
and, consequently, without kidneys, with only buds of the ureters
and bladder, and severe alterations in his respiratory function. In
the presence of this very serious clinical picture, the doctor
strongly advised against any attempt at dialysis therapy, since
according to the literature the pathology is defined by the World
Health Organization as a fetal pathology incompatible with life and
leads to sudden death after childbirth or at the most within a few
weeks. He also added that if one of his children had been affected
by this Syndrome, he would not have administered any treatment
and would have let him die without further suffering.
The following day, however, the same physician, in
contradiction with what he had previously said, asked Davide’s
parents to authorize him to transfer the infant to another hospital
specialized in pediatric nephrology and dialysis, located in another
city, for the child to be subjected to dialysis.8
The director of the operative unit where Davide was admitted
confided optimally in the renal transplant when he grew up.9,10
Disconcerted by his request, the parents obtained a day from
the same doctor to evaluate whether to accept his proposal.11
However, the following day they were amazed to learn that a
measure had been issued by the competent Juvenile Court, on
initiative of the hospital managers, who, among others, had not
consulted the Ethical Committee competent for the territory. Such
measure at the same time, not only had suspended their parental
authority (now called parental responsibility) but had also ordered
the immediate transfer of the minor to the hospital facility, located
in another city, and equipped for the implementation of the heroic
therapies prescribed by the treating physicians. After the transfer,
the Juvenile Court reinstated the parents of the child in their
parental authority. However, they were ordered: «to continue to
provide the maximum collaboration towards the health
professionals, and to adhere to all the instructions they received,
with the warning that in the case of non-compliance, measures
restricting parental authority could be adopted again against
them». Unfortunately, as was foreseeable, less than two months
later the child ceased to live, despite having been subjected to
artificial nutrition and feeding, as well as daily dialysis, sometimes
for 12 consecutive hours. Moreover, Davide was unreasonably
subjected to orchidopexy surgery for simultaneous testicular
retention. Clinically inappropriate therapeutic interventions could
otherwise be requested by the patient or by his family members.
This is the case of a 43-year-old woman, mother of two girls,
suffering from end-stage pancreatic neoplasia with multiple
widespread metastases, who asked the doctors of an Italian
hospital for the removal of some of the multiple metastases as she
was «willing to do anything to obtain an even short extension of
her life», because of the deep affection she felt for her minor
offspring. During surgery, unfortunately, injuries were caused to
the spleen and to the falciform ligament which produced a lethal
hemorrhage in the already severely debilitated patient.
The cause of death was undeniably identified in a «cardio-
circulatory failure occurred in a patient suffering from pancreatic
neoplasia with widespread multiple metastases in the peritoneum,
pleural cavities, intestines, ovaries, liver and lungs, who had
undergone oophorectomy and removal of a pre-sigmoid neoplastic
mass, with postoperative course complicated by bleeding due to
lesions in the falciform ligament and to the laceration of the
inferior pole of the spleen».
The existence of the causal link was also recognized in «the
omitted, timely identification of the lesions, especially the splenic
one, which caused the hemorrhage, also in consideration of  the
patient’s clinical conditions, made manifest also in the diagnosis of
multiple neoplastic pathologies, as well as in the diagnosis made
also by a foreign researcher and surgeon who worked on
pancreatic cancer; in the conditions of the patient that were
already known before surgery and, above all, in her blood values
in the and symptoms of progressive anemia she had presented
(hypotension, sense of oppression, etc.) in the postoperative
course, before the first cardiac massage (...), as well as in  the
omission to alert the surgical emergency department», considering
that, «if the necessary hemostasis maneuvers had been done, the
bleeding would  have been stopped and probably the patient would
not have died».
The case was brought to Court where the possibility emerged
of configuring a (negligent) criminal liability ascribable to the
health care provider for what in the literature has been defined as
allowed therapeutic overkill.12
Results
The clinical case that had Michael as its protagonist was
brought before judicial court by his parents who claimed compen-
sation for damages, against the doctors for clinically inappropriate
therapeutic interventions. The judges concluded that the doctors
had practiced the resuscitative activity without considering the
highly predictable harmful consequences for the newborn − cur-
rently suffering from serious physical and mental impairments −
and, in so doing, had acted in violation of art. 37 of the French
Code of Medical Deontology of 1995,13 containing the prohibition
to carry out treatments consisting of unreasonable obstinacy in the
therapy.
Based on this consideration, the judges of the Tribunal
Administratif de Nîmes (Gard), with judgment of 2 June 2009 n.
622251,14 after declaring inadmissible the request for compensa-
tion for the damage filed by the parents against the physicians, for
lack of jurisdiction, judged the hospital responsible for the unrea-
sonable obstinacy put in place by the summoned doctors.
In the clinical affair that had Davide as its protagonist, the
newborn suffering from Potter Syndrome, the provision issued by
the Juvenile Court, which the parental responsibility was reinstated
with, takes a peculiar form, as they are required to «continue fully
cooperating with the doctors, adhering to all the indications given
to them, with the warning that, in case of non-compliance, meas-
ures restricting their parental authority could be adopted again
against them».
The substantial depletion of parental responsibility by the
judge forced the parents to give consent to all the treatments
planned by the doctors of the hospital where the child was hospi-
talized and, therefore, also to those they considered inappropriate
in fear that any dissent could have given rise to revocation of their
parental authority.
Davide was subjected to central venous catheter implantation,
orotracheal intubation with mechanical ventilation support, cre-
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ation of vascular access for dialysis therapy, surgical intervention
of peritoneal catheterization for bilateral dialysis and orchidopexy,
daily hemodialysis treatments, antibiotic therapy.
The last clinical case considered, characterized by the deliber-
ate request by the patient for treatments not proportionate to the
benefits achievable, was the subject of three degrees of judgment
in criminal proceedings, which ended with sentence n. 13746 of
the IV criminal section of the Italian Court of Cassation,15 on
January 13, 2011.
The resolution of the case, in the second instance judgment,
concluded with the sentence of the Court of Appeal of Rome on 28
May 2009, seemed relatively simple. Reference to an error in the
surgery, and to a failure to promptly activate the block of the bleed-
ing, as the cause of death, recalls a classic hypothesis of generic
guilt for violation of the leges artis. This means that, the appeal
judges, in their motivations, could have related to the traditional
canons of ascertaining negligent responsibility in the medical field,
and therefore reason in terms of predictability and avoidance of the
concrete event, i.e. death because of hemorrhage. But a further pro-
file of guilt has been identified in the violation of the rules of pru-
dence, as well as of the provisions dictated by science and by the
conscience of the operator, and this is the most argumentative pas-
sage in the sentence of conviction.
This because, according to the assumption of the Court of
Appeal of Rome, given the precarious conditions of the patient,
whom only few months of life remained and as such, had to be
considered inoperable, there were no good reasons to expect that
surgery, although chosen by the patient, could produce a benefit for
her health and/or an improvement in her quality of life.
Consequently, it was stated that, in carrying out the operation, the
surgeons had ended up acting in contempt of art. 16 of the then
applicable code of medical deontology,16 which expressly forbids
treatments consisting of a «useless diagnostic and therapeutic
obstinacy».
The Supreme Court of Cassation, far from recognizing the
legitimacy of the appealed judgement by the Court of Appeal of
Rome with reference to the criminal responsibility of the accused,
has not addressed ex professo the subject of the aggressive treat-
ment, but has limited itself to acquitting the doctors for intervened
prescription of the crime.
Discussion and Conclusions
The judicial provision adopted by the judges of the Tribunal
Administratif de Nîmes in their judgment No. 62251 of 2nd June
2009 is emblematic, since the failure to comply with the prohibi-
tion of disproportionate treatments, with the consequent unjust suf-
fering caused by the artificial prolongation of life by means of
invasive technologies, although is not rare in practice, has not yet
been the subject of judgments in other countries.
In the Italian legal system, the violation of the prohibition of
disproportionate treatments - which art. 16 of the current Code of
Medical Deontology is dedicated to - from the point of view of
civil law, entails not only the violation of the aforementioned law,
but also the failure to comply with art. 2 of the recent law n.
219/2017 (on informed consent and advance directives) and the
non-compliance with the right to live even the last phases of life
with dignity.17 The latter is the cardinal value of modern
Constitutions and of the Charter of Nice. If, then, as sometimes
happens, unreasonable obstinacy in the therapy is also matched by
lack of information or even by an explicit dissent manifested by the
patient, the violation of the aforementioned provisions adds to the
non-compliance with the principle of self-determination of the
patient about his own care, with the consequent possible hypothe-
sis, in both cases, of a serious breach that legitimizes specific and
independent requests for compensation for damage. See Articles 2,
13 and 32 of the Italian Constitution, appropriately referred to by
the recent Law No. 219/17, Article 1.
The Italian case Davide, still pending civil judgement before
the competent judicial bodies, could be examined in the light of
this address, aimed at admitting compensation for damage due to
the violation of the prohibition of stubborn treatments. It can pro-
vide an opportunity for also Italian jurisprudence to open up to
compensation for damage caused by unreasonable obstinacy.
The intervention of the tutelary judge requested directly by the
doctors, rather than being an expedient to provide legal cover for
the administration of extraordinary and disproportionate health
treatments, should have instead met the need to achieve a synergy
between different professional figures, meant to relieve the suffer-
ing of little David and of his parents.
Therefore, the stubborn decision of the doctors to expose the
newborn to further and utterly useless suffering, caused by daily
dialyses and Artificial Nutrition and Hydration (ANH) does not
seem to be supported by any plausible reason - other than the cen-
surable one - to carry out a sort of atypical experiment. Their deci-
sion is so much the more reprehensible as it contrasts with the
unanimous opposite orientation expressed by the child’s parents,
and is therefore in breach of both the legal obligation to obtain
parental consent to the treatments to be carried out on Davide, and
of the deontological duty to evaluate with the parents the propor-
tionality or not of the treatment in relation to the expected results.
Parental dissent for life-saving treatments of the child cannot
be accepted uncritically.18
An equally severe judgment must be expressed also about the
work of the Juvenile Court, which did not even feel the need to
acquire the opinion of the parents and of the Ethics Committee of
the hospital which the child was entrusted to, regarding the reason-
ableness of the choice unilaterally made by the medical therapists,
to the end of taking a considered and informed decision.
In urgent terms, then, the question arises of determining
whether, in the clinical practice, we should rely exclusively on so-
called technical assessments, and therefore on parameters reserved
to the competence of the attending physicians, or whether impor-
tance should also be attached to the perception that every single
patient has of treatments or, if incompetent, his legal representa-
tive.19
In the Italian literature, eloquent, in this regard, is what
Cardinal Martini wrote a few years ago, in relation to the lacerating
Welby case:20 «The point is that to determine if a medical interven-
tion is appropriate you cannot refer to a general, almost mathe-
matical rule, which to deduce the appropriate behavior from, but
careful discernment is necessary that considers the concrete con-
ditions, the circumstances and the intentions of the subjects
involved. In particular, the will of the patient cannot be disregard-
ed, as it is up to him to assess whether the treatments offered to
him, in such cases of exceptional gravity, are effectively propor-
tionate, also from the legal point of view and with well-defined
exceptions».21
It is necessary to ask ourselves what importance is to be
attached to the patient’s will, which could well be contained also in
the anticipated treatment provisions, whereby, despite having
acquired full awareness of the uselessness of the therapies, also on
the basis of accessible and complete information provided by his
physician, rather than expressing his disagreement to undergo
them - as it would be logical to expect - not only manifests adhe-
sion to them, but even requests them.22
In this context, the quality of the information provided and
                                Article
No
n-c
om
me
rci
al 
us
e 
ly
their understanding by the patient are of primary interest.23-25
The use of simplified and appropriate modules at the cultural
level of the patient, integrating the oral interview with the doctor,
could facilitate the transmission of the information elements so as
to obtain its full self-determination.26
Apart from the consideration that if the will of the patient were
to prevail in any case, one would end up completely neutralizing
the preceptive value of the art. 2, paragraph 2, of the recent law n.
219 of 22 December 2017, according to which: «In cases of
patients with poor or short-term prognosis of imminent death, the
doctor must refrain from any unreasonable obstinacy in the admin-
istration of treatments and from the use of unnecessary or dispro-
portionate treatments», it seems more appropriate, instead, to offer
the treating physician an indicative criterion inferable from the
same law, as well as from the aforementioned code of medical
deontology (articles 16 and 22). We are herein referring to the pos-
sibility of a reasonable connection of the above-mentioned art. 2,
paragraph 2, with art. 1, paragraph 6, of the same law, where it is
stated that «The patient cannot demand health treatments contrary
to the law, professional ethics or good clinical care practices.  In
the face of such requests, the doctor has no professional obliga-
tion».
It may well be deduced, then, that, in response to a patient’s
request for disproportionate treatments in relation to the results
obtainable in practice, in accordance with the dictate of the afore-
mentioned law, the doctor can oppose his refusal, thus safeguard-
ing his autonomy. and therefore, his dignity both as a person and
as a professional.
The opinion of the Italian Constitutional Court therefore
deserves being carefully considered, where - although not with
specific reference to unreasonable obstinacy - it has observed that
«it is not normally the legislator that can directly and specifically
establish what therapeutic practices are admitted and with what
limits and under what conditions. Since the practice of medical art
is based on scientific and experimental acquisitions that are con-
stantly evolving, the basic rule in this matter is the autonomy and
responsibility of the doctor who makes professional choices based
on the available state of knowledge, always with the consent of his
patient».27
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